Summary
- Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region.
- China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU.
- Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests.
- Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers.
- As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
Introduction
China has undergone a significant transformation over the past decade, expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean through military modernisation, cooperation with partners, and active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. This expansion poses a threat to the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the European Union (EU). The Indian Ocean is of strategic importance to Europe, as its key maritime trade routes to Asia pass through this region. Therefore, ensuring the security of the Indian Ocean and freedom of navigation is crucial for European interests. However, many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean lack the economic resources to effectively control their maritime territories and are dependent on external powers. In response to China’s assertiveness, the EU and India should collaborate to establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for these states.
China’s Penetration into the Indian Ocean
China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean can be traced back to its 2015 white paper on military strategy, in which it explicitly stated its goal of becoming a maritime power. Since then, China has transformed its navy, known as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), from a coastguard into a blue-water navy capable of operating globally. The PLAN has participated in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia, deployed submarines and ships to the Indian Ocean, and established military bases in strategic locations such as the Coco Islands (Myanmar) and Djibouti. China has also secured rights to use various ports in the Indian Ocean, known as the “string of pearls,” which has expanded its military and commercial network.
China’s growing military presence and strategic use of ports in the Indian Ocean have raised concerns among other actors in the region, including India and the EU. India considers itself as the regional “net security provider” and sees China’s presence as a threat to its status. For Europe, the Indian Ocean is a primary gateway to the markets of the Indo-Pacific, and the security of sea lines of communication is vital for European trade. China’s naval presence in the region gives it the ability to control traffic and limit the freedom of other actors, potentially affecting European sea lines of communication and constraining India’s influence and security.
China’s Diplomatic Engagement with the Small States of the Indian Ocean
China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean is not limited to military activities. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has extended its influence over countries in the region through investments in infrastructure and commercial facilities. It has financed and constructed ports in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, and Bangladesh. China has also engaged in active diplomacy with the small island states of the region, including Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. These states play a crucial role in protecting sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and are located on key maritime routes between Europe and Asia.
China’s engagement with these island states has political value in its competition with the US and India. Beijing has been attempting to establish facilities near India for decades, increasing New Delhi’s vulnerability. China has established embassies on each of the six islands in the Indian Ocean and has become a dialogue partner in regional organizations such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Commission. By participating in these organizations, China fosters relations with these states and gains recognition as a legitimate regional actor.
China’s Cooperation with Partners in the Indian Ocean
China aims to bring together key powers in the Indian Ocean around its agenda. It has established partnerships with countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Iran, leveraging their convergences to advance its interests. China’s partnership with Pakistan is aimed at countering India, while its cooperation with Russia is driven by a common opposition to the US. China and Russia have conducted joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, signaling their desire to expand their influence in the region. China also employs grey zone strategies, such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, to achieve its strategic objectives without engaging in overt military conflict. Its large fishing fleet operates in international waters and encroaches on other countries’ territorial waters, posing economic and ecological consequences for coastal states.
The Weakness of the Regional Response
Despite the increasing normative arsenal in the Indian Ocean, regional actors often lack the resources to effectively respond to China’s presence. Many island and coastal states in the region have limited economic resources and maritime jurisdiction, making it challenging for them to control their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). As a result, they are heavily dependent on external powers for their maritime security. African naval forces, in particular, have been absent from naval operations aimed at ensuring maritime security off the Horn of Africa. While capacity building programs exist, they are often carried out on a bilateral basis and do not involve large parts of the region.
Strengthening Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean
To address the challenges posed by China’s assertiveness in the Indian Ocean, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building program for island and coastal states
SDGs, Targets, and Indicators
SDG 14: Life Below Water
- Target 14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics.
- Indicator 14.4.1: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels.
SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions
- Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.
- Indicator 16.4.1: Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars).
SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals
- Target 17.6: Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism.
- Indicator 17.6.1: Number of science and/or technology cooperation agreements and programmes between countries.
Analysis
1. Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?
The SDGs that are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article are SDG 14: Life Below Water, SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, and SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals.
2. What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?
Based on the article’s content, the specific targets that can be identified are:
– Target 14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics.
– Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.
– Target 17.6: Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism.
3. Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?
Yes, there are indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets. The indicators are:
– Indicator 14.4.1: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels.
– Indicator 16.4.1: Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars).
– Indicator 17.6.1: Number of science and/or technology cooperation agreements and programmes between countries.
Table: SDGs, Targets, and Indicators
| SDGs | Targets | Indicators |
|---|---|---|
| SDG 14: Life Below Water | Target 14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics. | Indicator 14.4.1: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels. |
| SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions | Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime. | Indicator 16.4.1: Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars). |
| SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals | Target 17.6: Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism. | Indicator 17.6.1: Number of science and/or technology cooperation agreements and programmes between countries. |
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Source: ecfr.eu
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