Lebanon’s judicial independence and the end of impunity – Middle East Institute

Report on Judicial Independence in Lebanon and Alignment with Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction: The Imperative for Judicial Reform in Achieving SDG 16

Judicial independence is a foundational component for achieving Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). In Lebanon, while Article 20 of the Constitution affirms this principle, its practical application has been consistently undermined, impeding progress towards SDG 16. Decades of political interference, institutional collapse during the civil war (1975-2000), and post-war sectarian entrenchment have eroded public trust and weakened judicial authority. The 2019 financial crisis further exacerbated these issues with severe budgetary constraints. This report analyzes the challenges to Lebanon’s judiciary, examines recent legislative reforms, and provides recommendations, framing the entire issue within the context of developing the effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions required by SDG 16.

Challenges to Judicial Independence: Barriers to SDG 16

Lebanon’s judiciary faces systemic challenges that directly obstruct the country’s ability to meet key targets under SDG 16, particularly Target 16.3 (promote the rule of law and ensure equal access to justice) and Target 16.6 (develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions).

Political and Executive Interference

The most significant barrier is the lack of separation of powers in practice, which manifests as pervasive political interference. This undermines the development of accountable institutions (SDG 16.6) and obstructs the rule of law (SDG 16.3).

• Appointment Mechanisms: The executive branch, through the government and the minister of justice, directly appoints senior members of the judiciary, including the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). This process is frequently exploited to ensure appointments are based on political and sectarian loyalty rather than merit, creating a judiciary vulnerable to external pressure.
• Obstruction of Justice: High-profile cases, such as the 2020 Beirut port explosion investigation and post-2019 financial sector cases, have been systematically hampered by political interference and the use of legal maneuvers to suspend investigations. This demonstrates a failure to provide access to justice for victims and end impunity.
• International Comparison: Lebanon’s system, where only one SJC member is elected by peers, contrasts sharply with systems in France and Italy, where peer-election is dominant, thereby reducing executive influence and better aligning with international standards for judicial independence.

Financial and Administrative Deficiencies

The lack of financial autonomy is a critical vulnerability that compromises judicial independence and the ability to ensure equal access to justice for all (SDG 16.3).

• Budgetary Dependence: The judiciary lacks a dedicated and independent budget, leaving it reliant on allocations from the executive branch. Since 2019, severe budget cuts have crippled its operations.
• Impact on Personnel: Judicial salaries depreciated to unsustainable levels (below $150 per month at one point), threatening the economic independence of judges. Support has relied on a mutual fund financed by litigant fees rather than a stable state budget.
• Operational Paralysis: A lack of resources for basic supplies, electricity, and IT infrastructure has led to significant delays in delivering justice, effectively denying citizens their right to a timely legal process.

Legislative Reforms: Progress Towards Stronger Institutions (SDG 16.6)

In a positive development for SDG 16, the Lebanese parliament adopted a draft law on the independence of the ordinary judicial courts on July 31, 2025. While not yet in force, this law represents a crucial step toward building more effective and accountable institutions.

Key Provisions of the 2025 Draft Law

1. Strengthened Supreme Judicial Council (SJC): The law grants the SJC broader and final authority over judicial appointments and transfers, limiting the executive’s ability to obstruct these processes. If the Ministry of Justice fails to issue a decree within 45 days, SJC decisions become enforceable, a significant change from the previous system.
2. Enhanced Judge Protections: The reform introduces safeguards protecting judges from arbitrary dismissal and political pressure, enshrining their right to freedom of expression and compelling the state to protect them and their families. This aligns with the need for an impartial judiciary as a cornerstone of the rule of law (SDG 16.3).
3. Reformed SJC Composition: The number of SJC members elected by their peers is increased from two to four. This reduces the government’s influence over the council’s composition and is a move toward more participatory and representative decision-making (SDG 16.7).
4. Judicial Inspection Authority Independence: The law reinforces the autonomy of this oversight body by restricting the supervisory role of the minister of justice.

The law was returned to parliament for a second review on September 5, 2025. This presents an opportunity to address remaining weaknesses and further strengthen its alignment with SDG 16 principles.

Analysis of Remaining Gaps and Recommendations for Full SDG 16 Alignment

Despite the progress represented by the draft law, significant gaps remain that prevent the full realization of judicial independence and the achievement of SDG 16 targets.

The Administrative Judiciary and Court of Accounts

The reforms do not extend to other critical pillars of the judicial system, leaving them vulnerable to the same political interference that plagues the ordinary courts.

• State Council: The government retains authority over the appointment of chamber presidents without giving the State Council Bureau a final say, unlike the new powers granted to the SJC.
• Court of Accounts: The law governing this body does not mention judicial independence. Its senior members are appointed directly by the Council of Ministers, with no requirement for input from the institution itself.

Financial Autonomy

The new law fails to address the fundamental issue of financial independence, a prerequisite for a truly independent and effective judiciary capable of ensuring access to justice for all (SDG 16.3).

• Budgetary Control: The budgets for all three judicial branches remain incorporated within executive branch budgets (Ministry of Justice and Prime Minister’s office), perpetuating a critical dependency.
• Spending Authority: The president of the SJC lacks the spending powers granted to the heads of the State Council and Court of Accounts, creating an institutional discrepancy.

Recommendations

To fully institutionalize judicial independence and achieve SDG 16, the following reforms are necessary:

1. Expand Peer-Election: Amend appointment mechanisms for the SJC, State Council, and Court of Accounts to ensure a majority of members are elected by their peers, thereby minimizing executive control.
2. Enshrine Financial Autonomy: Establish separate and independent budgets for each of the three judicial branches. A minimum budgetary threshold, determined by the judicial councils themselves, should be legally mandated to safeguard their operational capacity.
3. Standardize Appointment Criteria: Mandate that all judicial appointments be based on objective, merit-based criteria and require that heads of institutions be appointed from within their respective bodies.
4. Introduce Enforcement Mechanisms: For the State Council and Court of Accounts, introduce time limits for the issuance of appointment decrees, after which the nominations take effect automatically, mirroring the reform in the new law for ordinary courts.

1. Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?

• SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

  The entire article is dedicated to the challenges and necessary reforms for Lebanon’s judiciary. It directly addresses the core principles of SDG 16, which aims to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” The text focuses on judicial independence, political interference, lack of financial autonomy, and the loss of public trust in the justice system, all of which are central to building strong institutions and ensuring the rule of law.

2. What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?

1. Target 16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.

   The article highlights the failure to uphold the rule of law due to a weakened judiciary. It states that the goal of reforms is to “ensure that justice in Lebanon is a guaranteed right accessible to everyone” and to “end the impunity under which it has historically operated.” The discussion of obstructed investigations, such as in the “2020 Beirut port explosion,” demonstrates the lack of equal access to justice, as political power is used to prevent accountability.

2. Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.

   The article describes how “political interference has long been a major obstacle to the functioning of the judiciary.” It details how appointments are based on “political loyalty and sectarian affiliation” rather than merit, which is a form of institutional corruption. This interference compromises impartiality and allows powerful figures, including “key figures in the financial sector,” to evade justice, thereby undermining efforts to combat corruption.

3. Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

   The central theme of the article is the need to reform the Lebanese judiciary to make it an effective, accountable, and transparent institution. It points out deep-rooted challenges, including the lack of “administrative and financial autonomy” and the fact that the judiciary is not a “credible check on power.” The proposed reforms, such as strengthening the Supreme Judicial Council and ensuring financial independence, are direct measures aimed at achieving this target.

4. Target 16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

   The article discusses the mechanism for appointing members of the Supreme Judicial Council. It contrasts the old system, where the executive branch held most of the power, with the proposed reform that “restructured the mechanism for the appointment of Supreme Judicial Council members, expanding the number of elected members from two to four.” This move towards “peer-election” is a clear step towards more participatory and representative decision-making within the judicial institution itself, reducing the dominance of the executive branch.

3. Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?

1. Public trust in the judiciary.

   The article explicitly states that “the public has long since lost trust in justice in Lebanon.” An increase in public confidence, which could be measured through surveys, would be a key indicator of progress towards a more effective and just legal system (relevant to Target 16.6).

2. Proportion of judicial council members selected through peer-election versus executive appointment.

   This is a quantifiable indicator directly mentioned in the text. The article notes the new law increases the number of elected members in the Supreme Judicial Council from two to four. This ratio serves as a direct measure of the judiciary’s internal independence and participatory nature (relevant to Target 16.7).

3. Financial autonomy of the judiciary.

   The article implies this can be measured by whether the judiciary has a budget separate from the executive branch. It notes that currently, the judiciary’s budget is incorporated into the “Ministry of Justice’s budget” or the “prime minister’s office.” Achieving a separate, independently managed budget would be a clear indicator of progress. Furthermore, the adequacy of judges’ salaries, which the article notes fell to “less than $150 per month,” is another measurable financial indicator (relevant to Target 16.6).

4. Incidents of political obstruction in high-profile cases.

   The article cites the investigations into the “2020 Beirut port explosion” and cases involving “banks and key figures in the financial sector” as examples where political interference and legal obstacles have stalled justice. A reduction in the number of such obstructions and the successful, impartial conclusion of these cases would serve as an indicator of a strengthened rule of law (relevant to Target 16.3).

4. Create a table with three columns titled ‘SDGs, Targets and Indicators” to present the findings from analyzing the article.

Source: mei.edu